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TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH: THE ABM TREATY AND "STAR WARS"
TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT
By Kevin C. Kennedy*
In the latest interpretation of the 1 3-year-old Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty'
(ABM Treaty)-one that stunned the arms control community 2-the Reagan
administration announced on October 6, 1985, 3 that the United States is
authorized under the Treaty to develop and test advanced technology, space-
based weapons systems such as lasers and particle beam weapons.4 According
to the administration, the ABM Treaty places no restrictions, short of actual
deployment, on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the so-called Star
Wars program.5 Although Secretary of State George Shultz has stated that
the United States will continue to exercise restraint in the SDI program by
limiting the development and testing of weapons according to a "restrictive"
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida.
'Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 UST 3435, TIAS No.
7503 [hereinafter cited as ABM Treaty].
2 N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at A6, col. 1; Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 1, col.
2; Miami Herald, Oct. 21, 1985, at 13A, col. 1.
-'See Weinberger, U.S. Defense Strategy, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 675, 679 (1986). The announcement
came through then National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane on the NBC television
program "Meet the Press." EcONOMIsT, Nov. 2, 1985, at 21, col. 1.
" For a description of the types of advanced technology weapons being considered under
the Strategic Defense Initiative program (SDI), see Grier & Armstrong, Star Wars, Will It Work?
(six-part series), Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 4, 1985, at 28-30; Nov. 5, 1985, at 20-21; Nov.
6, 1985, at 20-22; Nov. 7, 1985, at 20-21; Nov. 8, 1985, at 18-20; Nov. 12, 1985, at 30-32.
For a discussion of the potential effectiveness of SDI, see Guertner, What Is "Proo"?, FOREIGN
POL'Y, No. 59, Summer 1985, at 73; Bennett, "Star Wars". The Battle Intensifies, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Nov. 4, 1985, at 26, col. 2. See also Weinberger, SDI: Realities and misconceptions,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 16, col. 2. For a discussion of the Soviet Union's
response to SDI, see Rivkin, What Does Moscow Think?, FOREIGN POL'Y, No. 59, Summer 1985,
at 85.
1 ECONoMISr, Nov. 2, 1985, at 21; Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 36, col. 1. For
example, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle stated on Oct. 16, 1985: "In my
judgment there is one correct view of what the [ABM] treaty provides." He continued:
After one wades through all the ambiguities and reads carefully the text of the treaty
itself and the negotiating record. . . with respect to systems based on "other physical
principles" Isuch as lasers and directed-energy weapons], we have the legal right under
the treaty to conduct research and development and testing unlimited by the terms of the
treaty....
Id. For an excellent analysis of the legality of the SDI program vis-a-vis the ABM Treaty, see
A. SHERR, LEGAL ISSUES OFTHE "STAR WARS" DEFENSE PROGRAM (Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear
Arms Control Monograph, 1984).
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interpretation6 of the ABM Treaty, the question remains whether a legally
sound basis exists for the administration's "permissive" interpretation of
the Treaty.7
This article examines two interrelated questions raised by the Reagan
administration's October 6 announcement. The first is whether the admin-
istration's permissive reading of the ABM Treaty squares with the consenting
Senate's understanding of that Treaty. To what exactly did the Senate give
its advice and consent when it advised ratification of the ABM Treaty in
1972? As a corollary, this article discusses the fundamental constitutional
question posed when a treaty interpretation by the executive branch is ar-
guably at odds with the consenting Senate's understanding of the treaty.s
We begin with a brief overview of the SDI program, followed by a back-
ground discussion of the ABM Treaty.
I. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE PROGRAM
In a nationally televised speech on March 23, 1983,' President Reagan
launched the Strategic Defense Initiative program, an ostensibly defensive
weapons system intended to replace the 25-year-old nuclear regime of mutual
assured destruction or MAD."0 As the President asked rhetorically in his
March 23 address, "What if free people could live secure in the knowledge
that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to
deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic
missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?"' "1 The Pres-
6 Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 36, col. 1. At the same time, Secretary Shultz
did not reject the new interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Id.
' For an excellent background discussion of SDI and the ABM Treaty, see A. SHERR, supra
note 5; Note, Star Wars Meets the ABM Treaty: The Treaty Termination Controversy, 10 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 701 (1985). For a history ofthe strategic arms negotiating record ofthe Reagan
administration through 1984, see S. TALBOTT, DEADLY GAMBITS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRA-
TION AND THE STALEMATE IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL (1984). See generally C. GRAY, AMERICAN
MILITARY SPACE POLICY (1982); P. STARES, THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE, U.S. POLICY,
1945-1984 (1985).
" The question whether the Reagan administration's reading of the ABM Treaty is consistent
with the international law of treaty interpretation is beyond the scope of this article. For a
background discussion on this subject, see Note, supra note 7, at 720-25. See generally I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 623-30 (1979); A. MCNAIR, THE
LAW OF TREATIES (1961).
9 Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC.
437 (Mar. 28, 1983) [hereinafter cited as President's Address].
"o Id. at 442-43. See Weinberger, supra note 2, at 680-81. For a general discussion of nuclear
deterrence theory, see P. GREEN, DEADLY LOGIC: THE THEORY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
(1966); Keeny & Panofsky, MAD versus NUTS, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 287 (1981-82); Kennedy, A
Critique of United States Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 35 (1983).
" President's Address, supra note 9, at 442. The Reagan administration's SDI program
contemplates a "layered" defense system that would intercept incoming Soviet missiles at various
phases of their flight path, from boost to terminal phase. For an overview of the weapons
systems under consideration, see U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BAL-
LISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES (1985); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AS-
SESSMENT, DIRECTED ENERGY MISSILE DEFENSE IN SPACE-A BACKGROUND PAPER (1984); Bethe,
Garwin, Gottfried & Kendall, Space-Based Ballistic-Missile Defense, 251 Scl. AM., No. 4, October
1986]
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ident concluded his remarks by expressly assuring listeners that SDI would
be conducted consistently with U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty.1 2
The SDI program's focus is on "the whole spectrum of offensive nuclear
ballistic missiles, not just long-range missiles aimed at the U.S."'" Research
is being conducted in the basic areas of directed-energy weapons such as
lasers and particle beam weapons, and kinetic-energy weapons such as rail
guns that can launch objects at enormous velocities.' 4 The mission and near-
term goals of SDI have been publicly elaborated on by representatives of
the Reagan administration on various occasions. For example, in hearings
before the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations held on May
7, 1985, Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson, Director of the Strategic
Defense Initiative Organization, explained the goals of the SDI program:
The goal of the SDI is to conduct a program of vigorous research
focused on advanced technologies that could provide a basis for a future
decision to further develop and deploy strategic defenses.. . . The
driving force behind [the President's] concept is to render nuclear bal-
listic missiles impotent and obsolete.. . . SDI is a research program
that seeks to provide the technical knowledge required to support a
1984, at 39-49; Grier& Armstrong, supra note 4, Nov. 4, 1985, at 28-30. For additional views
on the feasibility of SDI, see Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1985: Hearings on S.2414 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2893-
3128 (1984). For an administration description of SDI technology research programs, see De-
partment of Defense Autho rization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986: Hearings on S.674 Before
the Subcomm. on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4050-4127 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
"2 President's Address, supra note 9, at 443. Although the Strategic Defense Initiative ulti-
mately envisions the militarization of space once it advances beyond the research phase and
enters the development and testing phases, President Reagan made no mention of the possible
impact SDI would have, for example, on the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 UST 2410, TIAS No. 6347, 610 UNTS 205 (entered into force
Oct. 10, 1967), popularly known as the Outer Space Treaty. Article III of the Outer Space
Treaty obligates parties to carry on their activities in space in accordance with international
law, "in the interest of maintaining peace and security and promoting international cooperation
and understanding." Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty forbids the stationing cr placing in
orbit around the Earth of "any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons
of mass destruction." Article IV also bans the testing of any type of weapon on the moon and
other celestial bodies. In the effort to capture the high frontier of outer space, it ib not incon-
ceivable that SDI could eventually entail the development and testing of weapons platforms
that are moon based. However, at least insofar as the public declarations on the SDI program
are concerned, to date no mention has been made of moon-based activities. For IL discussion
of conformity of SDI with other treaty obligations of the United States (such as the Limited
Test Ban Treaty), see Note, supra note 7, at 706-09.
For additional administration views and testimony on SDI and U.S. compliance with the
ABM Treaty, see Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 4139-47.
s Weinberger, supra note 4, at 16, col. 2. For additional administration views and testimony
on SDI, see Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 3437-3525, 3972-4008.
14 See Department of Defense Appropriations for 1986: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Defense
Appropriations of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., lstSess. 584-85 (1985) [herein-
after cited as House Hearings]; Grier & Armstrong, supra note 4, Nov. 4, 1985, at 28-30.
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decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive
systems. It is not a program to deploy those systems.'5
General Abrahamson went on to express his views on how SDI squares
with the ABM Treaty, presenting what has come to be considered the "re-
strictive" interpretation of the Treaty:
The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deploy-
ment of ABM systems and components that are space-based, air-based,
sea-based, or mobile land-based. However, as Gerard Smith, chief U.S.
negotiator of the ABM Treaty, reported to the Senate Armed Services
Committee in 1972, that agreement does permit research short of field
testing of a prototype ABM system or breadboard model. Our research
under the SDI program will be within those limits. 6
Thus, so long as it is limited to research, the SDI program arguably does
not breach the ABM Treaty even under the "restrictive" interpretation of
the Treaty. As is explained below, 7 it is universally agreed that antiballistic
missile research in any basing mode is not prohibited under the Treaty.
Nevertheless, assurances by the Reagan administration of Treaty compliance
notwithstanding, the SDI program is planned to evolve through four pro-
gressively more sophisticated phases, the first of which is limited to research
through the 1990s. Thereafter, the program will enter the development
and deployment phases, depending on the progress of the research phase.'
Until then, the question whether SDI violates the ABM Treaty will be ac-
ademic. If and when these later development phases of the SDI program
are entered, however, SDI will threaten to breach the ABM Treaty in its
present form. For, as the next two sections explain, it is far from clear that
the ABM Treaty permits development, let alone deployment, of SDI tech-
nologies.
II. THE ABM TREATY
The ABM Treaty was the product of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT), a process formally begun in November 1969,19 but whose genesis
may be traced back 5 years earlier. In 1964, President Johnson delivered a
message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva in
" House Hearings, supra note 14, at 568-69. The price tag on SDI research through fiscal
year 1989 has been placed at $26 billion. Id. at 569. Congress approved 74% of the Defense
Department's FY 1986 budget request for SDI research. Weinberger, supra note 2, at 682.
" House Hearings, supra note 14, at 569. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has expressed
a similar sensitivity to compliance with the ABM Treaty, stating that "SDI is a research program
. . . and is in complete accord with the ABM Treaty." Weinberger, supra note 4, at 16, col.
3. A breadboard model is an experimental arrangement to test feasibility. WEBSTER'S Naw
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 134 (1981).
'
7 See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
"House Hearings, supra note 14, at 581-82.
"See T. WOLFE, THE SALT EXPERIENCE 1-3 (1979); UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 132-33 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as ACDA AGREEMENTS].
1986]
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which he proposed that Washington and Moscow explore a verified freeze
on strategic offensive and defensive weapons. It was not until October 1969,
however, that the White House and the Kremlin announced that SALT
would begin in Helsinki on November 17, 1969.20
Following 2 years of negotiations, 21 the first round of SALT was con-
cluded on May 26, 1972, when President Nixon and General Secretary
Brezhnev signed 22 the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on strategic
offensive arms.2' The Senate advised ratification of the ABM Treaty on
August 3, 1972; President Nixon ratified the Treaty on September 30, 1972;
and it entered into force on October 3, 1972, following a formal exchange
of ratification instruments. 24 The Treaty is of unlimited duration. 25 The
parties agreed to a protocol to the Treaty in 1974.28
In broad outline, the ABM Treaty, together with the protocol, limits the
United States and the Soviet Union each to one ABM deployment area,27
so restricted and so located that it cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense
or become the basis for developing one.28 At the ABM site, there may be
no more than one hundred interceptor missiles and one hundred launchers.
29
20 T. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 1-3.
2' For a brief history of those negotiations, see id. at 8-14; S. TALBOTT, ENE GAME: THE
INSIDE STORY OF SALT 1119-24 (1980).22 See ACDA AGREEMENTS, supra note 19, at 135.
2
. Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
May 26, 1972,23 UST 3462, TIAS No. 7504. For the etymology of"SALT," see S. TALBOrT,
supra note 21, at 19 n.*.
24 ABM Treaty, supra note 1, 23 UST 3435.
21 Id., Art. XV, para. 1, 23 UST at 3446.
1
6 Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, 27 UST
1645, TIAS No. 8276 [hereinafter cited as ABM Protocol].27 Id., Art. I, 27 UST at 1646. The Soviet Union has in place an ABM system defending
Moscow. The ABM system at Grand Forks, North Dakota, was dismantled by the United States
in the mid-1970s. See T. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 13 n.75; ACDA AGREEMENTS, supra note
19, at 161.
2' ABM Treaty, supra note 1, Art. 1, 23 UST at 3436.29 Id., Art. III, 23 UST at 3440. Article III provides:
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:
(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty
kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more
than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor
missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes,
the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three
kilometers; and
(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty
kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than
one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles
at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corre-
sponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the
Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no
more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potenial of the
smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.
Quantitative restrictions have thus been placed on radars as well. Id.
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In addition to these quantitative restrictions, technological improvements
are likewise limited; for example, both parties are prohibited from devel-
oping, testing or deploying ABM launchers capable of launching more than
one interceptor missile at a time."0
As concerns permissible basing modes, the Treaty permits deployment
of an ABM system that is fixed and land based.31 While Article III of the
Treaty describes in some detail the permissible basing mode of an ABM
system, it does not state in haec verba that the ABM system shall be fixed and
land based. However, Article V, paragraph 1 of the Treaty indicates that
this was the parties' intention: "Each party undertakes not to develop, test,
or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile land-based.,1 2 If Article III is read in conjunction with
Article V, the ABM Treaty permits only a fixed, land-based deployment
mode of ABM systems or components. This conclusion is buttressed by one
of the several "Common Understandings" that were reached between the
U.S. and Soviet delegations during the Treaty negotiations.33 Common Un-
derstanding C provides:
On January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following state-
ment:
Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes
an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based
ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side
indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile
ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of
ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types.
At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation.
Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. side's interpretation put
forward on May 5, 1971?
On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general
common understanding on this matter.3 4
The Reagan administration has not challenged this understanding that
the ABM Treaty, together with the ABM Protocol, permits each side to
deploy only one fixed, land-based ABM system; rather, the current debate
centers on the permissibility of developing and testing advanced technology
weapons systems based in space. The debate over what the ABM Treaty
permits vis-A-vis SDI is fueled by Article V, paragraph 1 of the Treaty and
Agreed Statement D, 5' also a part of the Treaty,36 which are discussed below.
30 Id., Art. V, para. 2, 23 UST at 3441. 31 See id., Art. III, 23 UST at 3440.
32 Id., Art. V, para. 1, 23 UST at 3441.
33 As part of the ABM Treaty, several Agreed Statements, Common Understandings and
Unilateral Statements were appended to the Treaty. See Agreed Statements, Common Under-
standings, and Unilateral Statements Regarding the Treaty between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles, May
26, 1972, 23 UST 3456, TIAS No. 7504.
4 Id., Common Understanding C, 23 UST at 8458.
SSee infra note 46 and accompanying text.
Gerard Smith, chief negotiator for the United States in the SALT I negotiations, has
written:
19861
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As has been noted, 7 Article V prohibits each party from developing,
testing or deploying an ABM system or component other than one that is
fixed and land based. While deployment means putting a fully operational
ABM system or component into service, what "developing and testing" a
prohibited ABM system or component consists of has not been entirely free
of doubt. Given the technological limitations on verification, the consensus
is that, at a minimum, laboratory research is permitted in connection with
any type of ABM basing mode." Allowing all types of ABM research essen-
tially amounts to recognizing that verification by "national technical
means," 39 the only method of verification permitted under the ABM
Treaty,4 ° is practically impossible. Attempting to ban by treaty conduct that
cannot be verified is considered naive in the highly sensitive area of arms
control. Since "research" thus constitutes activities short of "development"
as contemplated under the Treaty, so long as the SDI program is limited to
research, it does not violate the Treaty.
As for what constitutes "development," during the SALT I negotiations
the parties never reached agreement on a definition of that term,4 1 inten-
tionally leaving it ambiguous. At the 1972 Senate hearings on the ABM
Treaty, Dr. John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering,
offered the following explanation of "development": "[A] prohibition on
development. . . would begin only at the stage where laboratory testing
ended on ABM components, on either a proto-type or bread-board model. 42
Gerard Smith, the chief U.S. negotiator for the ABM Treaty, echoed Dr.
Foster's explanation when he testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee in 1972. Ambassador Smith stated that the prohibitions on de-
velopment contained in the ABM Treaty "would start at that part of the
development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype
or breadboard model.",43 Although these two statements furnish less than a
"bright line" definition of the term "development," they do suggest that,
at the least, certain kinds of development that can be detected by national
[S]ystems employing possible future types of components to perform the function of
launchers, interceptors and radars are banned unless the Treaty is amended. [Agreed
Statement D] was initialed by Semenov [the Soviet Union's negotiator] and me on the day
the SALT agreements were signed. As an initialed common understanding, it is as binding
as the text of the ABM Treaty.
G. SMITH, DOUBLETALK: THE STORY OF THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS 344
(1980).
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
s Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 4, 1985, at 3, col. 3 ("The treaty, for instance, allows research
on all types of ABM systems and components").
" "National technical means of verification" is a euphemism for satellite reconnaissance,
radar and other information collection techniques short of espionage and on-site inspection.
ACDA AGREEMENTS, supra note 19, at 135; T. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 13-14.
ABM Treaty, supra note 1, Art. XII, 23 UST at 3443.
4' Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 4, 1985, at 4, col. 3.42 Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the
Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Armed Services, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Militaiy Implications].
4 Id. at 377.
860
HeinOnline -- 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 860 1986
THE ABM TREATY AND "STAR WARS" TESTING
technical means-e.g., rudimentary field testing, as opposed to laboratory
testing-may come within the prohibitory ambit of the ABM Treaty.
In any event, the crux of the argument made by the Reagan administration
is not that SDI "development and testing" somehow differs from "devel-
opment and testing" as used in the prohibitory provisions of the ABM Treaty.
Rather, its contention, far from being built on such semantics, has as its
cornerstone Agreed Statement D, which, the administration maintains, spe-
cifically permits all SDI development and testing in any basing mode, short
of actual deployment." If new ABM systems or components are created
that, in the language of Agreed Statement D, are "based on other physical
principles," then, according to the administration, any limitation on their
development and testing would be subject to further discussion and agree-
ment between the United States and the Soviet Union.45
Does Agreed Statement D, when read in the context of the ABM Treaty
considered as a whole, support the administration's view? Agreed Statement
D provides:
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM
systems and their components except as provided in Article III, of the
Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other
physical principles and including components capable of substituting
for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are cre-
ated in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their com-
ponents would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII
and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.4 6
Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy and one of the chief architects of the Reagan administration's per-
missive interpretation of the ABM Treaty,4 7 has stated that the development
and testing of exotic space-based weapons employing "other physical prin-
ciples" such as lasers and particle beams is permitted under Agreed Statement
D.4" In his view, if new ABM systems "based on other physical principles"
are created, limitations on them would be subject to further negotiation and
agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.4 9
Another representative of the Reagan administration, Paul H. Nitze, a
veteran arms control negotiator and senior arms control adviser to the Pres-
ident,5" has argued that the negotiating record of the ABM Treaty shows
that the United States attempted to close the door on all new defensive
weapons but that the Soviet Union would not agree to such a proposal.5 '
44 See supra note 5.
4' Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 36, col. 2; Prognosis for an Ex-Virgin, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 2, 1985, at 14; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at A6, col. 1.
"ABM Treaty, supra note 1, Agreed Statement D, 23 UST at 3456. For a comment on the
purpose of such Agreed Statements, see infra note 63.
4' Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 36, cols. 1-3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at A6,
cols. 5-6.
48 Id.
4 Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 36, cols. 1-3.
50Id., Oct. 24, 1985, at 5, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at 6, col. 5.
"' Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 24, 1985, at 5, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at 6,
col. 5.
19861
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Hence, Agreed Statement D was appended to the Treaty to take account
of the Soviet position that the ABM Treatyshould not rule out the possibility
of developing and testing future technologies based on other physical prin-
ciples.5 2 In addition, Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser of the State De-
partment, has also taken the position that the ABM Treaty, when read in
the light of Agreed Statement D, only prohibits the actual deployment of
new systems based on "other physical principles," not their development or
testing."
In short, in the view of several key persons within the Reagan adminis-
tration, Agreed Statement D on exotic technologies is to be read in con-
junction with and as an expansion of Article V of the Treaty, not as a lim-
itation on the basing modes and systems permitted under Article III."
Critics of the administration's interpretation of Agreed Statement D-
whose numbers include the chief negotiator of the ABM Treaty, Gerard
Smith-5 -counter that Agreed Statement D was meant to supplement Article
III of the Treaty, which permits a fixed, land-based ABM system of inter-
ceptor missiles and radars, not an ABM system of space-based lasers and
particle beam weapons. Agreed Statement D was not meant to qualify Article
V, paragraph 1, they maintain, which prohibits the development and testing
of ABM weapons in all other basing modes.56 Accordingly, in their view,
Agreed Statement D only allows the development and testing of new tech-
nologies that are introduced to replace fixed, land-based ABM ,systems or
their components.5 7
Agreed Statement D is not the most happily drafted of provisions, nor is
it free of ambiguity, reading as though meant to be the international lawyer's
answer to the Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, throughout this debate
scant attention has been paid to how the Senate viewed the ABM Treaty at
the time it gave its advice and consent to ratification.58 A review of the
legislative history is illuminating, for it supports the position of those critics
who have challenged the Reagan administration's permissive interpretation
of the ABM Treaty.
III. THE SENATE ABM TREATY HEARINGS
During the summer of 1972, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Senate Committee on Armed Services held extensive hearings on
12 Christian Sd. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 36, col. 3.
" N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at 6, col. 4. The terms "ABM systems or comporents" found
throughout the Treaty are not defined, which thus gives rise to an ambiguity over what constitutes
prohibited systems or components under the Treaty. The SDI technologies being contemplated
have been characterized by the Reagan administration as ABM "subcomponents" or "adjuncts,"
and therefore as not being prohibited under the Treaty. Id.
54 id.
55 ECONOMrsT, Nov. 2, 1985, at 21; Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 36, col. 2.
" See sources cited in note 47 supra.
17 See sources cited in note 47 supra. In addition, Article I of the Treaty prohibits deployment
of a nationwide antiballistic missile defense. See supra note 28 and accompanying Iext.
" See Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 36, col. 3.
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the ABM Treaty,59 pursuant to the Senate's constitutional advise-and-consent
role. 60 The Foreign Relations Committee conducted 7 days of hearings,
beginning onJune 19,1972.61 The first witness called was Secretary of State
William P. Rogers, who gave the following testimony about the qualitative
restrictions imposed by the Treaty: "Perhaps of even greater importance as
a qualitative limitation is that the parties have agreed that flture exotic types
of ABM systems, i.e., systems depending on such devices as lasers, may not
be deployed, even in permitted areas."62 Later in his testimony, Rogers
reiterated the point: "Under the agreement we provide that exotic ABM
systems may not be deployed and that would include, of course, [an] ABM
system based on the laser principle."6
The next witness to appear before the committee was Ambassador Gerard
Smith, at that time the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and the chief U.S. negotiator of the ABM Treaty. He echoed Sec-
retary Rogers's views on the deployment of exotic weapons: "[W]e have
covered the concern of yours in this treaty by prohibiting the deployment
of future type technology.. . .[T]he laser concern was considered and both
sides have agreed that they will not deploy future type ABM technology
unless the treaty is amended."64
These statements are far from unambiguous as regards basing modes and
the scope of the prohibition on development and testing. Neither Secretary
Rogers nor Ambassador Smith specifically testified that development and
testing were prohibited in basing modes other than a fixed, land-based one,
which leaves open the possibility that all types of development and testing
are permitted short of actual deployment.
59 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements]; Military
Implications, supra note 42.
U.S. CONST. art. II, §2.
61 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, supra note 59, at 1.
6 Id. at 6.
"' Id. at 20. In response to questions by Senator Charles Percy regarding potential misun-
derstandings caused by the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, Secretary Rogers
gave the following answers:
9. Question.. . . What uill prevent differing interpretations of these "clauses" [understandings,
interpretations, and unilateral statementslfrom causing a major misunderstanding and hinder[ing]
the successful implementation of the agreements?
Answer. These materials were intended to avoid misunderstanding of the underlying
agreements and to facilitate successful implementation of such agreements. The clarification
provided by these interpretations and statements is believed to far outweigh whatever risk
there may be that they, in turn, might become subject to differing interpretations [emphasis
in original].
10. Question. Would it be safe to say that these clauses are really another form of safeguard
particularly since they deal with such crucial areas as concealment, ABM technology advances, and
missile modernization?
Answer. Yes, they do constitute a form of safeguard against misunderstandings in these
crucial areas.
Id. at 53.
"Id. at 20.
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What was the Senate's understanding regarding the development and
testing of exotic weapons in a space-based mode under the Treaty? Senator
James Buckley, one of two senators who voted against the ABM Treaty,
65
made the following highly instructive remarks before the Foreign Relations
Committee during the hearings:
I challenge the morality of precluding the possibility of developing at
some future date new approaches to antiballistic missile defenses which
could offer protection to substantial numbers of our people.
This clause, in Article V of the ABM Treaty, would have the effect, for
example[,] of prohibiting the development and testing of a laser-t)pe system
based in space.. . . The technological possibility has been formally
excluded by this agreement.
There is no law of nature that I know of that makes it impossible to
create defense systems that would make the prevailing theories obsolete.
Why, then, should we by treaty deny ourselves the kind of development
that could possibly create a reliable technique for the defense of civilians
against ballistic missile attack?6 6
No senator on the committee and no subsequent witness challenged Senator
Buckley's analysis.
6 7
Senator Buckley's statement not only sheds enormous light on what at
least one senator understood the ABM Treaty to prohibit, but also was fully
corroborated by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. In testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 6, 1972, Secretary Laird
gave the following response to a question from Senator Goldwater regarding
advanced technology ABM systems:
With reference to development of a boost-phase intercept capability
or lasers, there is no specific provision in the ABM treaty which prohibits
development of such systems.
There is, however, a prohibition on the development, testing, or
deployment of ABM systems which are space-based, as well as sea-based,
air-based, or mobile land-based. The U.S. side understands this pro-
hibition not to apply to basic and advanced research and exploratory
development of technology which could be associated with such systems,
or their components.
There are no restrictions on the development of lasers for fixed,
land-based ABM systems.. .. Space-based ABM systems are prohib-
ited by Article V of the ABM treaty ....
Thus, in Secretary Laird's view, the development and testing of advanced
technology weapons systems in any mode other than a fixed, land-based
mode is prohibited by the Treaty. However, basic research, as commonly
understood within the arms control community, could proceed in all basing
modes.
6 Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 36, col. 3.66 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, supra note 59, at 257-58 (emphasis added).
617 Id. passim.
6 Militay Implications, supra note 42, at 40-41.
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Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, also
appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Dr. Foster under-
scored that the development and testing of exotic ABM weapons is permitted,
but only in conjunction with a fixed, land-based ABM system as envisaged
in Article III of the Treaty. In this connection, the following colloquy took
place between Senator Henry Jackson and Dr. Foster:
SEN. JACKSON.. . . [I]s there anything in these agreements that
impinge[s] on our right to research those areas that bear on both our
defense and on defense capability? Specifically, there is a limitation on
lasers, as I recall, in the agreement and does the SAL agreement prohibit
land-based laser development?
DR. FOSTER. No, sir; it does not.. .. What is affected by the treaty
would be the development of laser ABM systems capable of substituting
for current ABM components.
"You can develop and test up to the deployment phase offuture ABM system
components which are fixed and land based.69
In a similar exchange between Senator Margaret Chase Smith and Gerard
Smith, it was strongly suggested that developing and testing exotic ABM
systems in any mode other than a fixed, land-based one would be prohibited
under the ABM Treaty:
SEN. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, you say that the treaty prohibits the
development of other ABM systems. Would this affect a development
of a laser ABM system by the United States?
MR. SMITH.. . . [O]ne of the agreed understandings says that if
ABM technology is created based on different physical principles, an
ABM system or component based on them can only be deployed if the
treaty is amended. ... [D]eployment of systems using those new rin-
ciples in substitution for radars, launchers or interceptors, wouldnot
be permitted unless both parties agree by amending the treaty.
70
Finally, General Bruce Palmer, Acting Army Chief of Staff, answered the
following question posed by Senator Jackson:
SEN. JACKSON.. . . [S]o the [Joint] Chiefs went along with the con-
cept here involved-
GEN'L PALMER. A concept that does not prohibit the development
in the fixed, land-based ABM system. We can look at futuristic systems
as long as they are fixed and land based.
SEN. JACKSON. I understand.7'
Id. at 274 (emphasis added).
7o Id. at 295. The same point was made by General W. P. Leber, Safeguard System Manager:
The only limitation in the [ABM] treaty ... is that either side. . . would not use a
laser device to substitute for any other component part of the ABM system. . . . [I]f you
propose to substitute, for example, a laser device for the interceptor, that would be pro-
hibited, an amendment to the treaty would be required for deployment.
Id. at 439.7 1 Id. at 443.
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It was on the basis of this understanding that SenatorJackson, together with
an overwhelming majority of his fellow senators,7 2 advised and gave his
consent to ratification of the ABM Treaty.
Considering this legislative history as a whole, the Reagan administration's
permissive interpretation of the ABM Treaty appears to differ substantially
from the consenting Senate's understanding of the Treaty. A fair reading
of the Senate hearings strongly suggests two conclusions about the meaning
of the ABM Treaty: first, that when Article III, paragraph I of Article V
and Agreed Statement D are read together, their import is that the devel-
opment and testing of "Star Wars" technology in any basing mode other
than a fixed, land-based mode is prohibited; and, second, that the deployment
of such technology in even the fixed, land-based mode is prohibited under
the Treaty.
These seemingly divergent views of the ABM Treaty raise two crucial
issues: (1) whether the President is free to reach an interpretation of a treaty
that varies with the consenting Senate's understanding of that treaty; and
(2) if he is not, how such conflicts in treaty interpretation are to be resolved.
The following section explores these fundamental constitutional issues.
IV. EXECUTIVE BRANCH-SENATE CONFLICTS
OVER TREATY INTERPRETATION
Professor Louis Henkin has observed that "the obligation and authority
to implement or enforce a treaty involves also the obligation and authority
to interpret what the treaty requires. T"7 1 In Henkin's view, the President, as
the person who speaks for the United States in international affairs, deter-
mines the position of the United States as to the meaning of a treaty vis-.'-
vis the other parties to the treaty.7 4 Nevertheless, the President's determi-
nation is subject to any understanding, reservation or declaration issued by
the Senate when it gave its consent to ratification. 75 In this connection, the
words of Justice Story in The Amiable Isabella are instructive: "[T]he obli-
gations of a treaty could not be changed or varied, but by the same 'ormalities
with which they were introduced; or, at least, by some act of as high an
import, and of as unequivocal an authority." 76
There can be no serious disagreement that in the conduct of foreign
affairs the President requires wide latitude. Although this political fact of
life has been recognized by the Supreme Court, 77 the Court has been un-
receptive to claims by the executive branch to virtually unlimited powers in
72 Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1985, at 36, col. 3.
73 L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 167 (1972).
74 Id.
71 Id. Treaty interpretations by the President following Senate consent do not, of course,
have the consent of the Senate. Id.
716 The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) I, 75 (1821).
77See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936)
(where the Court noted the "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations").
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this field.7" Indeed, both Congress and the courts have claimed the inde-
pendent right to interpret treaties.79
The President's interpretation of a treaty may be accorded considerable
weight domestically by the other branches of government.80 A distinction
must be drawn, however, between a treaty interpretation by the executive
branch, which may be accorded weight by the courts, and a treaty reinter-
pretation by the President, which is tantamount to a treaty revision. Treaty
interpretation involves defining ambiguous terms and filling in interstices.
Absent a reservation or declaration by the consenting Senate, or other clear
evidence of the consenting Senate's understanding of a treaty, the President
is free to reach reasonable interpretations of a treaty, subject to possible
review by an international forum or a domestic court. Reinterpretation or
revision, on the other hand, involves making a new, amended version of a
treaty. Not only is such a reinterpretation subject to possible review by an
international tribunal or a domestic court, but, as a matter of U.S. consti-
tutional law, there can be no interpretation of a treaty different from that
which the consenting Senate clearly gave it.8
Although Agreed Statement D, Article III and Article V of the ABM
Treaty may contain ambiguities, the Senate hearings on the ABM Treaty
plainly suggest that the Senate's understanding of the Treaty accords with
the "restrictive" interpretation of that Treaty regarding the SDI program.
The issue is not simply an interpretation of an ambiguous treaty provision
by the executive branch, but a rewriting of a treaty by the Executive with
neither the advice nor the consent of the Senate. Such an arguably bold
reinterpretation of a U.S. treaty obligation by the executive branch is unique.
Where could this issue be resolved? There are at least four forums in
which the ABM-SDI controversy could be addressed, two international and
two domestic: an international tribunal such as the International Court of
Justice; the Standing Consultative Commission created under the ABM
Treaty;8" the U.S. courts; and the Senate.
7s Set, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1951) (Jackson,J,
concurring). See also L. HENKIN, supra note 73, at 45-65.
7 9 See L. HENKIN, supra note 73, at 416 n.128.
"o See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933).
s1 See L. HENKIN, supra note 73, at 167.
*2 Article XIII of the ABM Treaty provides:
1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the
Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework
of which they will:
(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related
situations which may be considered ambiguous;
(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary
to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;
(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means
of verification;
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the
provisions of this Treaty;
(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems
or their components in cases provided by the provisions of this Treaty;
1986]
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On the international level, while the World Court might be competent
to decide questions of treaty interpretation,"8 it obviously lacks the authority
to decide the domestic constitutional question of the meaning of the ABM
Treaty in light of the Senate ratification hearings. More importantly, how-
ever, it is improbable in the extreme that the United States would ask the
Court to decide whether SDI complies with the ABM Treaty, 4 considering
the recent U.S. experience in the Court concerning U.S. military involvement
in Nicaragua,8 5 as well as the national security implications of the SDI pro-
gram. In addition, the Soviet Union would probably not agree to this method
of resolving the dispute. Rather, it seems far more likely that if and when
SDI reaches the development and testing phases, the United States either
will seek modification of the ABM Treaty to accommodate SDI or will with-
draw from the Treaty altogether under Article XV, paragraph .86
A more promising forum for reconciling the Treaty and the SDI program
is the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), the bilateral U.S.-Soviet
review panel established to implement the provisions of the ABM Treaty
and the Interim Agreement.8 7 Because misunderstandings can be aired pri-
vately in the SCC, it is not only an important confidence-building measure,
but also an invaluable forum in which questions of possible treaty violations
can be resolved without causing international embarrassment to either side.
Of course, whether the Reagan administration's permissive interpretation
(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of
this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty;
(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic
arms.
2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate,
Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition
and other relevant matters.
" Statute of the International Court of Justice, Arts. 35-36, 59 Stat. 1055, TS No. 993, 3
Bevans 1153, 1179.
84 on Oct. 9, 1985, the State Department announced that the United States had terminated
its Declaration of Aug. 26, 1946, submitting to the compulsoryjurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. See Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 1445 (1985).
a See id.55Article XV, paragraph 2 of the ABM Treaty provides:
Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from
this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the
other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a
statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized
its supreme interests.
ABM Treaty, supra note 1, 23 UST at 3446.
17 See supra notes 23 and 82. For a discussion of the many disputes that the Standing Con-
sultative Commission has been called upon to resolve, see T. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 35-37;
S. TALBOTr, supra note 21, at 116, 143-44, 197-98; S. TALBOT, supra note 7, at 320.
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of the Treaty comports with the Senate's understanding can only be settled
indirectly by the SCC. From the perspective of crisis stability, however, the
SCC represents the most promising forum for resolving the SDI-ABM con-
troversy between the two superpowers. It is a forum in which the military,
intelligence and diplomatic communities from both sides can meet, exchange
information and share concerns over developments affecting the Treaty.
The SCC has proven invaluable in the past and should be seriously considered
as a mechanism for resolving the SDI controversy through quiet diplomacy.
Although the SCC had held regular biannual sessions lasting 4 to 6 weeks
since shortly after its inception in 1972," that routine regrettably broke
down soon after the Soviet Union terminated the Intermediate-Range Nu-
clear Force talks in Geneva in 1983.9
Of the domestic forums in which the ABM-SDI controversy could be
resolved, the courts immediately suggest themselves. The Supreme Court
has had several occasions to consider the treaty-making power under Article
II, section 2 of the Constitution.9' It has not, however, considered the precise
issue of an executive branch interpretation of a treaty being at odds with
the consenting Senate's understanding of the treaty. The closest the Supreme
Court has come to addressing this issue was in Goldwater v. Carter.9
In that case, the Court considered and rejected a claim that the Consti-
tution requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate before the President may
terminate a treaty. Nine senators and 16 members of the House of Repre-
sentatives sought declaratory and injunctive relief against President Carter9 2
following his announcement that the defense treaty between the United
States and the Republic of China would be terminated.9" A sharply divided
Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case
with directions to dismiss the complaint. 4 Several Justices filed opinions
stating their separate views.
Justice Powell would have dismissed the congressional complaint as not
ripe for judicial review.95 In his view, until such time as the President and
Congress reach a "constitutional impasse," the judicial branch should not
decide issues affecting the allocation of power between Congress and the
President. 96 "Otherwise," Justice Powell continued, "we would encourage
T. WOLFE, supra note 19, at 36. " S. TALBOTT, supra note 21, at 3-4.
"See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433
(1920); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 360 (1816).
9' 444 U.S. 996 (1979). See Berger, The President's Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty,
75 Nw. U.L. REv. 577 (1980-81); Note, Executive Action, Goldwater v. Carter, and the Allocation
of Treaty Termination Power, 15 GA. L. REV. 176 (1980-81); Note, Unilateral Presidential
Treaty Termination Power by Default: An Analysis of Goldwater v. Carter, 15 TFx. INT'L L.J. 317
(1980); Note, The Constitutional Twilight Zone of Treaty Termination: Goldwater v. Carter, 20 VA.
J. INT'L L. 147 (1979-80).
"' See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F.Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated,
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
" Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China,
Dec. 2, 1954, 6 UST 433, TIAS No. 3178, 248 UNTS 213 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1955).
4 444 U.S. 996. "Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
96Id.
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small groups or even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial res-
olution of issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to
resolve the conflict.",9 7 Since Congress as a body had not taken any official
action rejecting President Carter's claim of unilateral power to terminate
the treaty, Justice Powell did not believe it was the Court's task to do so.98
Justice Rehnquist, joined by three other Justices," concluded that the
case presented a nonjusticiable political question.' 0 0 As set forth in Baker v.
Carr, the political question doctrine incorporates three inquiries."" The first
is whether the text of the Constitution commits resolution of the issue
to one of the coordinate branches of government. The second is whether
resolution of the issue would require a court to move beyond areas of
judicial expertise. The third is whether prudence counsels against judicial
intervention.1
0 2
In his opinion, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the basic question presented
was a political one and therefore nonjusticiable.'0 3 That question, Justice
Rehnquist stated, "involves the authority of the President in the conduct of
our country's foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the
Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President."'01 4 As a practical
matter, Justice Rehnquist added, Congress has resources at its disposal to
protect and assert its interests, such as the power to regulate foreign com-
merce, to raise armies and to declare war.'0 5
In a dissenting opinion,10 6 Justice Brennan would have affirmed the de-
cision of the court of appeals on the ground that treaty termination in this
instance was tantamount to withdrawing recognition from a foreign gov-
ernment, a-power committed by the Constitution to the President alone.'
7
Goldwater v. Carter raises a host of questions about alleged treaty reinter-
pretation by the President and whether the judiciary may intervene in such
a case. First, is the President required to consult the Senate in matters of
treaty interpretation? If he is but fails to do so, can he be compelled to do
so by thejudiciary? Must the Senate, if it is not the same Senate that approved
the particular treaty, reach an impasse with the President before thejudiciary
will intervene? Does a member of the Senate have standing to challenge the
Executive's interpretation of a treaty? Are questions of treaty interpretation
by the President essentially political in nature and therefore nonjusticiable?
On its face, the question of the meaning of a treaty-the supreme law of
the land'--is perfectly suited forjudicial resolution. Federal judicial power
encompasses cases involving treaties made under the authority of the federal
9 7 id. 98 Id. at 998.
"Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate opinion in which ChiefJustice Burger, Ju.tice Stevens
and Justice Stewart joined. Id. at 1002.
'. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring). ,01 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
'o
2 Id. Had the case been ripe for review, Justice Powell would have answered all three
questions in the negative. 444 U.S. at 998-1001.
10S 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
104Id, . Id. at 1004 & n.1.
"6Id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting). '0 7 .d at 1007.
'08 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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Government. 0 9 Since 1803, when Chief Justice John Marshall first an-
nounced the doctrine in the landmark decision of Marbury v. Madison, 110
judicial review-the power of the courts to determine the validity of acts of
the other branches of government-has been a fixed star in American ju-
risprudence."1 As noted by Justice Powell in Goldwater, the duty of the
Supreme Court is to say what the law is. 1 2 While every treaty by definition
necessarily touches upon the conduct of foreign relations, a sphere tradi-
tionally reserved for the political branches of government, the Court in
Baker v. Carr explicitly rejected the contention that anything touching upon
foreign affairs is immune from judicial review1"' As far back as 1899, the
Supreme Court stated that the construction of treaties "is the peculiar prov-
ince of the judiciary," ' 4 not of Congress or the executive branch.
Given that the courts are not excluded from treaty interpretation, does
the SDI-ABM controversy nevertheless present a nonjusticiable political
question? Turning to an analysis of the three-pronged test in Baker v. Carr,
we must first ask whether the Constitution commits treaty interpretation to
one particular branch of government. 5 While no constitutional provision
explicitly confers the power to interpret treaties upon the President, neither
does any provision of the Constitution confer such power exclusively on the
Senate. Article II, section 2 of the Constitution does authorize the President
to make treaties, but only with the advice and consent of the Senate, which
supports the view that the power to interpret treaties is the President's in
the first instance, but is subject to any declaration on, reservation to or
understanding of the treaty by the consenting Senate.
Should the President be required, then, to consult with the Senate on
such questions? Arguably, he should. But for the Senate's approval, no treaty
would ever take domestic legal effect in the first place."' However, as is
discussed below, 7 there appears to be no constitutional requirement that
the President consult with the Senate on matters of treaty interpretation.
That conclusion, of course, does not mean that the President has an unfet-
tered hand in such matters.
U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 1. 110 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
,. See Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1; Frankfurter,
John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. RV. 217, 219 (1955); Corwin, Marbury
v. Madison and the Doctrine ofJudicial Review, 12 MICH. L. REv. 538 (1914).
"2 444 U.S. at 1001.
11 369 U.S. at 211 ("it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance").
,14Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 75 (1899). Compare Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276,
295 (1933) ("the construction of a treaty by the political department of the government, while
not conclusive upon courts called upon to construe it, is nevertheless of weight").
... See supra notes 10 1-102 and accompanying text.
116 However, an interpretation of a treaty that would be tantamount to a termination of that
treaty would raise a question quite similar to the one presented in Goldwater v. Carter. See supra
notes 90-107 and accompanying text. But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 587 (1952) ("In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker").
'
7 See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
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As for the second prong of the Baker v. Carr test, would resolution of this
issue require a federal court to move beyond areas of its expertise?"1 ' While
the arms control field is fraught with jargon, often unintelligible to the lay
public,' 19 the courts are frequently called upon to interpret highly complex
laws.' 20 In connection with the ABM Treaty, the task that the judiciary
would be called upon to perform would be closely analogous to a "garden
variety" problem of statutory interpretation, requiring no "special compe-
tence or information."' 121 More importantly, the interpretation of a treaty
should not present an inherently daunting task for the federal courts; it is
one that they perform regularly.
2 2
If the first two prongs of the three-pronged test of Baker v. Carr can be
met-that treaty interpretation is not committed to one of the other coor-
dinate branches and that resolution of the issue would not require the courts
to move into an area beyond judicial expertise' 2 3 -does prudence counsel
against judicial intervention? A ruling by the Court that the President has
not misinterpreted the ABM Treaty in light of the Senate hearings would
obviously not cause any embarrassment to the President, although such a
conclusion would certainly be unpalatable to any senator who had brought
suit. On the other hand, while the President may have the responsibility for
carrying out treaty obligations, and the incidental responsibility for inter-
preting those obligations, that does not mean that the President has the
power to rewrite treaty provisions. If the Court entertained a lawsuit brought
by members of the Senate challenging the President's interpretation of the
ABM Treaty, the conclusion that certain SDI development and testing is
illegal under the ABM Treaty-contrary to the opinion of the administra-
tion-while vindicating the Senate, would be a source of embarrassment to
the President, internationally and domestically.
Nevertheless, these consequences are all a question of degree. Considering
the serious constitutional issue implicated when the executive branch's in-
terpretation of a treaty is at odds with the consenting Senate's understanding
of that treaty, any attendant embarrassment to the Executive pales in com-
parison. Such a setback would arguably be no more embarrassing to the
executive branch than other major setbacks that Presidents have met with
8See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
.. See Goldwaterv. Carter, 444 U.S. at 1000 (Powell,J., concurring) (if "an inquiry demands
.. .special competence or information beyond the reach of the Judiciary," then it is one best
left for another branch).
120 Examples include patent cases (see, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)),
antitrust cases (see, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643 (1980)) and securities cases
(see, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973)).
121 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1000 (Powell, J., concurring).
122 See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (interpretation
of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Japan); American Ass'n of Ex-
porters & Importers-Textile & Apparel Group v. United States, 751 F.2d 1219 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (interpretation of the Multifiber Arrangement); Mast Industries, Inc. v. Regan, 596
F.Supp. 1567 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (interpretation of the Multifiber Arrangement).
123 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
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in the courts in the past.1 24 Moreover, it should come as no surprise to the
President that his treaty interpretation, if tantamount to a treaty reinter-
pretation in light of the consenting Senate's understanding of the treaty,
would run the risk of being invalidated by a reviewing court. In short, pru-
dence does not clearly counsel against judicial intervention in the SDI-ABM
controversy.
Assuming that a political question is not presented by this particular treaty
interpretation, 125 would the Senate have to pass a resolution rejecting the
Reagan administration's permissive interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and
thus directly confront the executive branch, before the judiciary would deem
the matter ripe for review? Arguably, the answer to this question is no. As
is noted below, 121 the ABM Treaty ought to be interpreted in light of the
legislative history of the Senate that approved it, not in light of the views of
a subsequent Senate. A useful analogy can be found in statutory interpre-
tation. The Supreme Court has stated that the views of a subsequent Congress
as to the meaning of a given statute cannot override the unmistakable intent
of the enacting one; it is the intent of the enacting Congress that controls.12
7
As shown in the foregoing discussion, the record of the Senate hearings
leaves little doubt that the Senate thought it was consenting to a specific
reading of the Treaty. In short, the views of the approving Senate should
be equally binding on the current President, the current Senate and the
courts. No official act by the current Senate designed to create a constitutional
impasse should be required for the matter to be considered ripe for judicial
review, since the views of that body have no legally binding effect regarding
the meaning of a provision of the ABM Treaty.
If a group of senators did file a lawsuit against President Reagan seeking
a declaration of the meaning of the ABM Treaty vis-a-vis SDI, would those
senators have standing to bring such an action? 21 Over the years, several
congressional-plaintiff lawsuits have been filed against the executive branch,
challenging alleged executive encroachment on the constitutional prerog-
' See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
125 Considering the penchant of the judiciary for invoking the political question doctrine to
avoid exercising its jurisdiction in cases involving national defense, it is perhaps unrealistic to
believe that a legal challenge by the Senate in this connection would succeed.
Nevertheless, the Reagan administration's revised interpretation of the ABM Treaty is quite
arguably not a "political question." See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 212 ("if there has been no
conclusive 'governmental action' then a court can construe a treaty and may find it provides
the answer"). When compared to the Carter administration's decision to terminate the defense
treaty with Taiwan in order to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China-a
paradigm of a political decision-a treaty interpretation that certain weapons systems may be
developed and tested pursuant to the ABM Treaty has fewer political overtones.
... See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
127 Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977). The Court has in fact given
the views of a subsequent Congress some weight generally only when the precise intent of the
enacting Congress was obscure. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572,
596 (1980).
128 Private citizens would clearly be unable to bring such an action because the ABM Treaty
is not self-executing. See Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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atives of Congress.' 29 These cases have not always been ringing successes
for the members of Congress who have brought them, having often been
dismissed for lack of standing' 30 or on the ground that such actions present
a nonjusticiable political question.' It seems doubtful that in their capacity
as private citizens, senators would not have standing.'8 While the Supreme
Court has not definitively ruled on the question,33 lower federal courts have
split on the issue; in some instances, they have found standing for members
of Congress," 4 but in others they have failed to find it.'
Arguably, however, members of the Senate qua senators should have
standing to bring an action challenging the President's interpretation of a
treaty.136 The nature of their complaint would be that the Executive's in-
terpretation, being at odds with the consenting Senate's understanding of
that treaty, so seriously erodes the Senate's constitutional advise-and-consent
role as to render it void. 3 7 If the focus is on whether the President's inter-
pretation of the ABM Treaty is consistent with that of the Senate that ap-
proved it, then institutional action by the current Senate should not be a
precondition to ripeness.13 8 Moreover, regarding standing, any senator qua
senator ought to have standing to bring an action to resolve such a serious
" See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S.
1304 (Marshall, CircuitJustice 1973); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See generally McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. RE'V. 241 (1981);
Note, Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1632 (1977).
IS0 See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973) (Congresswoman
Holtzman did not have standing qua member of Congress to attack the constitutionality of the
Vietnam War). But see Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Senator
Kennedy had standing to seek declaratory judgment that presidential pocket veto of a bill was
ineffective). See generally Note, Congressional Standing to Challenge Executive Action, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 1366 (1974).
151 See, e.g., Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). But see Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. at 211 (rejecting idea that anything touching foreign affairs-is immune from judicial
review). See generally Note, The Justiciability of Congressional-Plaintiff Suits, 82 CoI.uM. L. REV.
526 (1982). For an excellent overview of the case law dealing with the political question doctrine,
see Atlee v. Laird, 347 F.Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three-judge court), affd sub nom. Atlee v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
s See supra notes 128 and 130.
... The issue of standing by members of Congress as such was raised in the district court but
not reached by the Supreme Court in Mink v. EPA, 410 U.S. 73, 75 n.2 (1973).
134 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
'" See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973).1
s' See generally Note, Standing to Suefor Members of Congress, 83 YALE L.J. 1665 (1974); Note,
supra note 130.
137 Compare Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d at 435-36 (Senator Kennedy had standing to
challenge the validity of a presidential pocket veto on the ground that it deprived him "of the
effectiveness of his vote" in favor of the bill), with Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 714-15
(D.C. Cir.) (Senator Goldwater lacked standing to challenge treaty termination by the President
absent legislative action in conflict with the Executive), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); and Diggs
v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (members of Congress have no judicially
enforceable rights under treaty that is not self-executing).
a"8 Still, under Justice Powell's view of ripeness as stated in Goldwater, a Senate resolution
challenging the President's interpretation might still be a necessary precondition to any such
action. 444 U.S. at 996-1002.
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constitutional question, which trenches so heavily upon the Senate's role in
treaty making." 9 If any complaining senators happen also to have voted on
the ABM Treaty itself, a further argument could be made that they have
been denied their vote under Article II, section 2 of the Constitution, which
would confer standing upon them to challenge the President's permissive
interpretation of the ABM Treaty.14 °
Besides the question whether SDI development and testing is permitted
under the ABM Treaty, major domestic environmental concerns are poten-
tially implicated if huge outlays of federal funds are expended on such weap-
ons development."' National defense can be a supremely domestic concern
in this connection,2 only incidentally touching upon foreign affairs.' 43 Thus,
in addition to legal action by members of the Senate challenging the Pres-
ident's latest interpretation of the ABM Treaty, a lawsuit could conceivably
be brought by private citizens challenging the SDI program once it enters
the development and testing phases.
For example, a challenge could be made that such development and testing
contravenes the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which bans
federally funded projects that have a potentially adverse effect on the en-
vironment unless an environmental impact statement is first prepared and
published for public comment. 44 It is not entirely inconceivable that in the
course of such litigation a court would be presented with an opportunity to
consider whether the administration's permissive interpretation of the Treaty
is consistent with the consenting Senate's understanding, particularly if the
"
9 See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d at 434, where the court noted in a related context:
The provision under discussion [Art. I, §7 of the Constitution] allocates to the executive
and legislative branches their respective roles in the law-making process. When either
branch perceives an intrusion upon its legislative power by the other, this clause is appro-
priately invoked. The gist of appellee's complaint is that such an intrusion has occurred
as a result of the President's misinterpretation of this clause....
"4oSee Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d at 434; compare Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d at
1315.
141 See Guertner, supra note 4, at 74 ($26 billion for SDI research through fiscal year 1989);
Will Reagan's Star Wars Plan Fly?, Miami Herald, Nov. 6, 1985, at 2E, cols. 1-4 ("SDI officials
say an informal decision about whether these problems can be solved can be made by the early
1990s, after research costing some $30 billion").
142 See, e.g., Jackson County v. Jones, 571 F.2d 1004, 1007.(8th Cir. 1978) (Department of
Defense not excepted from the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act); Con-
cerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
10s See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 (rejecting notion that President has inherent power
as commander-in-chief to seize domestic steel mills as part of the Korean War effort).
144 42 U.S.C. §§4331-4335 (1982). See supra note 142 and cases cited therein. But see
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139 (1981) (national security exception to
NEPA allows Department of the Navy to keep secret whether it stores nuclear weapons in
Honolulu). Since the ABM Treaty is not self-executing, it is doubtful that a direct challenge
could be made by a private citizen to the President's permissive interpretation of the Treaty.
Compare Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979);
Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
1986] 875
HeinOnline -- 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 875 1986
876 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 80
court finds an apparent conflict between that interpretation and NEPA.' 45
If the court also finds that SDI development and testing run afoul of NEPA,
it could resolve the conflict by concluding that such SDI programs are in
violation of the consenting Senate's understanding of the Treaty, thus con-
struing the Treaty and NEPA so as to give effect to both.146 Nevertheless,
the prospects for success of a court challenge to the SDI program by private
individuals do not appear to be bright.
A fourth forum in which the question of treaty interpretation could be
resolved is the Senate itself. As a threshold question, is the President obligated
to consult with the Senate on a matter of treaty interpretation? Considering
that the President is responsible under his foreign affairs powers for carrying
out treaty obligations, 4 ' the President ordinarily would appear to have no
constitutional duty to consult with the Senate on such matters-although
failure to do so could be political suicide. Moreover, even if the Senate
involved happened to be the Senate that gave its consent to the particular
treaty, the answer would still appear to be no. Nearly 85 years ago the
Supreme Court considered the legal effect of a Senate resolution purporting
to interpret a treaty between Spain and the United States that ceded the
Philippines to the United States. 48 The Senate resolution was adopted by
a majority of those senators present and voting.'49 The Court held that in
any event, despite the lack of a two-thirds majority, "[t]he meaning of the
treaty cannot be controlled by subsequent explanations of some of those
who may have voted to ratify it.' ' 50
Although the President may thus have no constitutional duty to consult
with the Senate on a matter of treaty interpretation, the Senate has the
power to compel such consultation if it can muster the political will to chal-
lenge the President by threatening to or actually withholding defense ap-
propriations for SDI research. As Justice Rehnquist suggested in Goldwater
v. Carter, 151 the power of the purse can be a potent weapon in the area of
treaty interpretation.
V. CONCLUSION
A serious constitutional question is posed by a treaty interpretation of
the executive branch that appears to be fundamentally at odds with that of
the consenting Senate. If the Senate's advise-and-consent role is to be mean-
ingful and not a mere formality to treaty making, the advise-and-consent
clause must have teeth. It would do violence to that clause to say that the
executive branch may present a treaty for approval by the Senate, tell the
"' See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("the courts will always endeavor
to construe them [a treaty and legislation] so as to give effect to both, if that can be done
without violating the language of either").
146 Id.
""' L. HENKIN, supra note 73, at 164.
14' Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1899).
149 id. at 180. 150 Id.
... See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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Senate that it has a specific meaning, and then turn around after the Senate
has given its consent and say that the treaty now means something entirely
different. To so conclude would make a mockery of the Senate's role in
treaty making.
As the foregoing has shown, the President is bound by what the consenting
Senate's understanding of a particular treaty was at the time it gave its consent
to ratification. The President is not free to advance a contrary interpretation,
in either an international or a domestic forum. Conversely, if the consenting
Senate expressed no particular understanding of a treaty provision, or if it
passed no reservations or declarations respecting a treaty, the President
should have wide latitude, within the bounds of reason, to interpret that
treaty. If the Senate's consent was unconditional, a subsequent Senate cannot
add its own gloss on a given treaty.
In a case where the consenting Senate clearly expressed its understanding
as to the meaning of a treaty at the time it gave its consent to ratification,
the difficulties of forcing conformance by the executive branch to that un-
derstanding are formidable. In the final analysis, indirect resolution of the
controversy over SDI and the ABM Treaty by an international forum such
as the World Court is impractical, absent willingness on the part of the
executive branch to submit to an international tribunal's jurisdiction and to
abide by its determination. The same holds true for indirect resolution of
this controversy in a bilateral forum such as the SCC, unless the executive
branch shows some willingness to make concessions. Moreover, whereas the
interpretative conflict between the Senate and the executive branch could
be directly addressed in federal court, considering the genuine obstacles
posed by the political question doctrine, the doctrine of ripeness and the
doctrine of standing, the prospects for resolving this issue in a domestic
judicial forum also appear dim, though not as futile as in the international
forums.
The one forum that does hold out the prospect of a satisfactory resolution
of the SDI-ABM question is the Senate itself. For there the question of an
executive branch treaty interpretation at variance with the consenting Sen-
ate's understanding can be brought to the fore through the Senate's control
over defense appropriations.' 52 However, the power of the purse will only
represent a marginally more attractive alternative to litigation unless the
Senate dares to resist the President by withholding funds for SDI research.
While threats to withhold funds arguably are a more effective vehicle for
Congress to shape the contours of national defense policy, in a world of
pluralistic politics consensus is at a premium. In the end, however, the Senate
may amount to little more than a highly visible forum where debate on the
meaning of the ABM Treaty can be aired and conflicting opinions on that
question weighed.
152 U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, c. 7.
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